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SOVIET RELATIONS WITH INDOCHINA
IN THE 1970's

Master's Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Notre Dame in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts in Government

14 AFIT-CI-77-11

by

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12 54 p.

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11 August 1976

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER CI 77-11	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Soviet Relations With Indochina in the 1970s		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Thesis
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) LYNN A. HARRIS CAPTAIN, USAF		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS AFIT Student at University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS AFIT/CI Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433		12. REPORT DATE August 1976
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 47 pages
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES JERAL F. GUBBS, Captain, USAF Director of Information, AFIT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE AFR 190-17.		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Attached		

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TO JUDITH

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PREFACE

The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the recent fundamental political and economic relationships of the Soviet Union to the Indochinese states of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. My analysis basically includes the years from 1970 to 1975. Where it was possible and appropriate I incorporated more current data, but no source is later than June, 1976.

The official names of the Indochina countries are: Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia), People's Democratic Republic of Laos (Laos), and Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). I have been inconsistent only in referring to the DRV, which I may have variously called North Vietnam, Vietnam, or the DRV.

Wherever possible I have tried to stress the Soviet view from primary sources, but this was not always possible. In some cases data or commentary from Soviet sources was inadequate or lacking entirely. This was especially true for information relating to economic and military assistance, where I was forced to rely on United States estimates.

I express my appreciation to Notre Dame Professors George A. Brinkley, Michael J. Francis, and Theodore B. Ivanus for the knowledge they have imparted and for the patient consideration they have shown me.

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CHAPTER I

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

INDOCHINA IN THE HEIRARCHY OF SOVIET PRIORITIES

Indochina of itself has not been viewed by the Soviet Union as a vital national security interest. Historically the Soviet Union appears to have given first priority to its great-power relationship with the United States (and with Europe).¹ A second major interest has been the struggle with China for leadership of the communist world and for influence in Asia. It is in Southeast Asia in general and Indochina in particular where those two primary interests have collided.

For the Soviet Union, Indochina has been a microcosm of sometimes incompatible elements and objectives: (a) national liberation movements which it would like to support; (b) a socialist state (North Vietnam), threatened by "imperialism," which it feels obligated to sustain; (c) an opportunity to reduce American power and influence, but within the confines of peaceful co-existence; (d) a similar opportunity to reduce or contain Chinese influence; and (e) a possible opportunity in light of (c) and (d) above to "fill the void" with its own presence.² A more recent objective is the limitation of growing Japanese influence, while another goal is to seek expanded trade and open new markets. A final objective in view of a

rapidly expanding Soviet navy is to secure free naval access, base rights, and/or repair facilities in Indochina and the Southeast Asia region.³

SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY IN THE INDOCHINA REGION

Soviet-Chinese competition for influence in Indochina has been and will continue to be a major factor in determining Soviet relationships and policies in the area. The sudden communist assumptions of power in Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos --combined with a significant withdrawal of United States presence and influence--will probably intensify Sino-Soviet rivalry in Indochina and will be reflected primarily in efforts to win or sustain the loyalties of the new rulers there.⁴ The pressing need for reconstruction and development aid in the area would tend to give the competitive edge to the Soviet Union, which possesses the greater economic resources.

The efforts of both the USSR and China to gain prestige and influence in the Indochina region at each other's cost have resulted in a triangular relationship between them and the individual nations which has often redounded in greater political maneuverability (within limits) for the smaller states than if the Chinese and Russians were united in their views.⁵ As shall be seen, North Vietnam has proven quite adept at steering a zig-zag course between the two major communist powers.

THE SOVIET COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM IN ASIA

The Soviet Union's now vigorous campaign for an Asian collective security plan is interrelated with the growing Sino-Soviet rivalry in Indochina. The first major proposals for such a plan surfaced in mid-1969 in a milieu of political changes of world-wide significance: the border clashes along the Ussuri River in March revealed the Sino-Soviet "rift" as a widening, long-term chasm; China's Cultural Revolution had just ended, which signified a "normalizing" of Chinese diplomacy and a prospect of some change in its relations with the United States; and finally, the signs of the United States intention to reduce its role in Indochina could be apprehended (this was confirmed in July by President Nixon's "Guam Doctrine" address).⁶

In this context, and with a special concern for China's menacing "Great-Power, hegemonistic aspirations" in Asia,⁷ the Soviet Union has put increasing stress on the concept of collective security--especially since 1972.⁸ Most of the countries in Asia have been approached about the plan, and the Soviet press claims "innumerable indications that the idea of collective security is gaining ground in Asia."⁹

However, there have been no firm commitments to the Soviet proposal in Southeast Asia despite assurances "that it will be open to all Asian states...and that the entire system of collective security will not be directed against any separate Asian country...."¹⁰ Having heard years of vituperative denunciations of China's aggressive Asian "hegemonistic

aspirations" by the Soviet Union, it is little wonder that the less powerful nations in the area are fearful of being drawn into the jaws of Sino-Soviet rivalry; however, one analyst does suggest that Vietnam might be "coaxed" into joining a Soviet-sponsored collective security plan.¹¹

SOVIET-UNITED STATES DÉTENTE AND INDOCHINA

Several Soviet sources have suggested a relationship between détente and the communist victories in Indochina. Consider the following: .

The conclusive phase of the liberation struggle in Indochina developed successfully due to the new conditions, the new situation /sic/ that have obtained in the world under the influence of the progressive détente, triggered by the active and purposeful foreign policy of the USSR....¹²

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET POLICY

Although the USSR may want to think of its foreign policy in Indochina as "active and purposeful," some non-Soviet analysts suggest that its policies might more accurately be described as "reactive and risk-avoiding."¹³ Thus the Soviet Union has rarely taken the initiative with its policies; rather its policies have often been responses at least partially dictated either by changing local policies and situations or by pressures exerted by the United States, China, or leaders of the Indochinese nations.¹⁴

Soviet policy is risk-avoiding in that it has consistently revealed a preference for negotiated or political

settlements over attempts to achieve military victory. The Soviet Union has also been very sensitive about any possible uncontrolled escalation which might draw the USSR into a direct confrontation with either the United States or China or jeopardize its national interests or great-power relationships.¹⁵

CHAPTER II
SOVIET RELATIONS
WITH THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV)

POLITICAL RELATIONS

Soviet relations with the DRV might best be characterized as riding between the horns of a dilemma. On the one horn, the USSR has sought to portray itself as the staunchest supporter of Vietnam's revolutionary struggle¹⁷ and to prove that the USSR can do more for that struggle--and the reconstruction necessary after it--than can China. To this end Moscow has given Hanoi extensive propaganda and material support (see below).

On the other horn, the Soviet Union had become increasingly desirous of further détente with the United States (especially since the significant events of 1969) and sought to reduce the dangers from possibly uncontrollable escalation of local conflicts which might draw the USSR into more or less direct confrontations with either the United States or China. This horn of the dilemma suggests policies of restraint and a reduced involvement in Vietnam, which has resulted in the preference of the Soviet Union for a negotiated or political settlement of the war rather than support for a major North Vietnamese drive for military victory in the South.¹⁸

The duality of the USSR's policy in Indochina with the weight of emphasis on Soviet national interest and major power relationships has no doubt often been a source of frustration to the leaders of the DRV, for whom a unified Vietnam on Hanoi's terms was a prime objective. The Soviet preference for a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Vietnam cannot have been enthusiastically viewed by the Vietnamese communists; they had bitter memories of the 1954 Geneva agreement, where their interests were subordinated to those of the major powers--particularly the Soviet Union--and "negotiated" away.¹⁹ Thus the Vietnamese have consistently worked toward a military victory in the South.

Soviet support for a major North Vietnam/Viet Cong offensive aimed at full military victory was less than wholehearted throughout most of the Vietnam war period. There are at least three possible reasons for this "restrained" Soviet support before 1973. First, the USSR did not want to risk a major United States re-entry into the war (for reasons mentioned above). Second, the Soviet Union might not have desired a victory unless it was assured it could secure maximum influence over the Vietnamese. Third, in the face of intense Sino-Soviet rivalry, the USSR may have felt that a clear-cut victory might be interpreted as a demonstration of the correctness of the more aggressive Chinese "people's war" strategy as adapted by the Vietnamese, while a defeat would result in a loss of prestige for its more moderate "parliamentary" strategy.²⁰ Finally, the Soviets have

always spoken of the inevitability of an ultimate Communist victory in Vietnam; the main problem for them seems to have been one of timing and tactics;²¹ these in turn relate to the intricacies of Soviet-Chinese-United States relationships in the era of détente.

Thus in July 1971 the announcement of President Nixon's acceptance of an invitation to visit China evoked a reappraisal of Soviet policy in Indochina, the details and consequences of which are even now not fully comprehended, because many of the talks were secret. The Soviet press reflected a concern that United States-China agreements might be reached with a view to "pressure" Moscow to modify its position in Indochina.²² In October a major Soviet delegation visited Hanoi, possibly to assure the DRV's leaders of its support and also to influence Hanoi to take a more anti-Chinese stand.²³ Soviet success was limited in both respects. Hanoi regarded the resulting joint statement as not fully acceptable, and Hanoi's press voiced anxiety that both the Chinese and the Soviets were trying to impose a settlement on Hanoi.²⁴

There are conflicting views on how much support the Soviet Union gave to the North Vietnamese in 1972. The consensus seems to be that the USSR may have favored a controlled offensive of limited scope in order to embarrass President Nixon and the Chinese, to test "Vietnamization," and possibly to affect the United States election campaign; however, a major offensive aimed at military victory was almost surely opposed.²⁵ Hoang Tung, editor of Nhan Dan, the official

Vietnamese Workers Party newspaper, is reported to have told a visiting American that "revolutionary forces in the South would have scored even more spectacular gains in 1972 except for the restraint applied by the DRV's major allies."²⁶

The events of the year 1972 also served to underscore the Soviet Union's long-term priorities. For although Moscow was still sensitive enough to try to reassure Hanoi that increasing United States-Soviet détente would not be detrimental to Vietnamese interests, it nevertheless welcomed President Nixon despite the mining and blockading of Hanoi and Haiphong harbors just before his visit. Thus the immediate Soviet role in Indochina would appear to have been of lower priority than an enduring détente with the United States.²⁷

Whether the Soviet Union applied significant pressure on the North Vietnamese to sign the 1973 Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam is still a matter of some speculation. One analyst suggests that both the Soviet Union and China sought to influence the decision to sign, with China's pressure possibly being the more important one.²⁸ According to him, since 1965:

The Soviet Union...has been applying quiet political pressure upon Hanoi with the aim of moving it toward a political settlement somewhat more rapidly than Hanoi appeared willing to move spontaneously. It was only in late 1972, however, when they were supplemented by parallel Chinese efforts and reinforced by the failure of the North Vietnamese Easter offensive, that these Soviet pressures became effective.²⁹

Other factors, such as the massive United States bombing

raids of late December, secret promises of United States reconstruction aid, and assurances of military aid support by both the USSR and China may also have had some effect.³⁰

In late 1973, the fighting in Vietnam intensified (the ceasefire was never strictly adhered to by either the Communists or the South Vietnamese). North Vietnam ascribed the increased level of conflict, plus the total lack of any move toward a political settlement, to United States interference by its continued support of the Thieu regime. Leaders of the DRV approached China and the Soviet Union and asked that both allies apply pressure on the United States to cease its support of Thieu, lest the DRV be forced to resume fighting on a major scale. Neither ally favored a renewed military offensive, and so "cautioned" the United States and also helped to arrange a Paris meeting between Secretary of State Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. But such actions could hardly be called unqualified support.³¹

Two other events occurred in 1974 which were to significantly affect the future of Indochina. The first was a policy review made in July and August by the leadership of the Vietnam Workers Party. As a result of this review the DRV leadership decided to initiate an upsurge in "revolutionary activity" in order to pressure the Thieu regime to implement certain political provisions of the Agreement. Thus the revised strategy was not aimed at launching a major offensive, but rather at toppling Thieu and replacing him with leadership more amenable to a "political solution" (presumably

meaning a coalition government including representatives from the Provisional Revolutionary Government).³² The second significant event was that the annual negotiations in Moscow for Soviet aid to North Vietnam, which began in December 1974, were not concluded in January, as in the past, but remained open-ended to accommodate the military situation as it developed in the South.³³

Increased "revolutionary activity" began in late 1974, involving 14-15 North Vietnamese divisions; in January, 1975, two or three more divisions came south, and by the end of February there were 19-20 full divisions in the South.³⁴ After some initial successes in Phuoc Long province, the North Vietnamese launched a major regional offensive in the central highlands around the provincial capital of Ban Me Thuot in March. Then came Thieu's fateful decision to abandon that area and to pull the South Vietnamese army back to defend the major lowland cities. The pull-back became disorganized and panic ensued. The North Vietnamese then pressed their advantage with highly mobilized, blitzkrieg-like attacks, and less than two months after the major offensive began near Ban Me Thuot, South Vietnam surrendered.³⁵

The full extent to which the Soviet leadership supported the new offensive strategy of the North Vietnamese in late 1974 and early 1975 is unclear. Certainly unqualified support would have been a departure from the usual Soviet caution in similar situations. However, circumstances in late 1974 were considerably different from prior years: United States

forces (including air power) were almost totally withdrawn from the area; the U.S. Congress was becoming increasingly reluctant to approve further economic and military aid to the Thieu government; the War Powers Act had been passed, which made a presidential re-commitment of U.S. forces unlikely; a new president was in the White House; and the desire of both the U.S. Congress and the American people seemed to be to forget Vietnam and move on to more pressing domestic and world concerns.³⁶ Since a prime Soviet objective had been to avoid a major United States re-involvement in the area and that re-involvement seemed highly improbable, the Soviet Union could well have chosen to support the North Vietnamese offensive. The Soviet decision to keep the North Vietnam aid negotiations open-ended would tend to support this view, as would the post-victory rhetoric in the Soviet press.³⁷

Since 1971--and especially since 1973--there has been a trend toward more frequent, more varied, and more binding relationships between the Soviet Union and the DRV (See Appendix A, "Chronology"). These relationships will undoubtedly continue and expand in the period 1976-1980, and all indications are that they will continue to do so well beyond that. Consider the following Soviet summary of a 1975 declaration and agreement:

The USSR and the DRV intend to encourage visits by official delegations and statesmen for the maintenance of regular contacts, exchanges of views on Soviet-Vietnamese relations and on international problems of mutual interest. In accordance with the documents signed during the visit, the two sides

will promote further economic, scientific and technological cooperation both on a bilateral basis and within the framework of the multilateral cooperation of the socialist countries, this to include the coordination of national economic plans, the sending of skilled specialists, and the training of national cadres for various branches of Vietnam's economy, science, technology, and culture. Also envisaged is the expansion of Soviet-Vietnamese ties in the fields of science, culture, arts, education, public health, the press, radio, television, films, tourism, sports, and contacts between public and artistic bodies of the two countries.³⁸

In light of the historical Sino-Soviet competition for Hanoi's allegiance, it is interesting to note that Moscow's numerous political initiatives toward Hanoi since the Vietnamese victory have not been countered in any significant way by Peking, who appears now to view the DRV with increasing suspicion. China's three major concerns appear to be (1) whether Vietnam--now a major power in the area--will seek to control Cambodia and Laos and expand its support of other insurgent movements, thus rivaling China as a revolutionary mentor; (2) whether Hanoi will increasingly side with the USSR on military and political issues affecting China (as Hanoi did in renouncing NATO); and (3) whether the DRV will permit the Soviet Union the use of the significant naval facilities in Vietnam (Cam Ranh Bay has been specifically mentioned).³⁹

SOVIET ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO THE DRV

Trying to assemble meaningful statistics on Soviet aid is often a labor of Sisyphus. Soviet sources rarely give

any figures on the value of aid given, and non-Soviet sources sometimes differ in method and interpretation. For purposes of this analysis, one major estimate was used as a foundation, and other source estimates were reconciled with it as nearly as possible using a standard set of criteria. When dollar estimates from various sources were adjusted to the same base year (1974), there was surprisingly little non-reconcilable difference among them.⁴⁰ However, such estimates should be used cautiously and then only to indicate basic values, comparisons, and trends.

Excellent summaries of the nature and scope of USSR "material assistance" to the DRV can be found in recent articles in the Soviet press, although the value of such assistance is rarely given.⁴¹ One such summary (apparently covering the period 1965-1973) stated:

At all times Soviet material assistance to the DRV was the greatest in volume and the most valuable in content. It has always been and still is a decisive factor in achieving victories and successes of the Vietnamese people in their struggle and labour.

The USSR supplied the DRV with large quantities of food, oil products, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, chemical fertilisers, transport facilities, full sets of equipment and many other commodities and materials. Soviet economic and technical assistance is chiefly used to promote the development of promising branches of industry and agriculture. More than 160 industrial enterprises and other projects, many of them of crucial economic importance, have been either reconstructed or built with Soviet assistance.

Thousands of highly skilled Soviet specialists have taken part (and are taking part today) in building up and developing the DRV's economy throughout the peacetime and in the war years, and many thousands of young Vietnamese received higher

and secondary education or vocational training in the USSR.⁴²

Assuming that "material assistance" equates closely to the U.S. concept of economic aid, the value of Soviet economic aid to North Vietnam for the years 1965-1973 according to U.S. estimates would be about \$2.5 billion. For 1974, economic aid was about \$645 million. Soviet economic aid to North Vietnam has shown a distinct upward trend; total economic aid for the period 1970-1974 (\$1970 million) nearly doubled that of 1965-1969 (\$1090 million). (See Table 1 for the value of Soviet economic assistance by year and Table 2 for the value of total Communist economic assistance by year and by classification.)

In July of 1973 the USSR decided to regard all credits given to the DRV in preceding years to finance economic development as gratuitous assistance.⁴³ No estimate of the value of this assistance is available.

Since July 1973 at least eight more economic agreements with the Soviet Union have been signed (see Appendix A, "Chronology" for dates and a brief description).⁴⁴ By far the most significant of these agreements was that of October 27-31, 1975, which resulted in a momentous Soviet-Vietnamese Declaration.⁴⁵ This document marks a major milestone in Soviet-Vietnamese relations; and if its provisions are fully implemented, Vietnam may well assume a position in the Soviet sphere of influence very similar to that of Cuba.

The major elements of the "October Manifesto"⁴⁶ are:

TABLE 1

ESTIMATED SOVIET AID TO NORTH VIETNAM, 1965-1974^a
(Millions of Dollars at 1974 U.S. Prices^b)

Year	Military Aid	Economic Aid	Totals
1974	220	645	865
1973	165	325	490
1972	410	240	650
1971	175	375	550
1970	90	385	475
1969	140	295	435
1968	340	285	625
1967	595	235	830
1966	425	175	600
1965	250	100	350
Totals	2,810	3,060	5,870

^aEstimates vary and with rare exceptions cannot be verified from Soviet sources. Non-Soviet sources have been reconciled to the extent possible. Figures are rounded to the nearest \$5 million for convenience.

^bPrice indexes from Survey of Current Business, January, 1976, p. S-2.

Sources: Asia Research Bulletin, May, 1972, (compare figures for 1967, 1970, and 1971 with those in "Soviet Arms Aid to Hanoi Is Down," New York Times, April 12, 1972); joint CIA/DIA estimate for U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 3689, Part 1, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, pp. 108-110; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Trade Registers: The Arms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm, 1975), pp. 152-155; Leo Tansky, "Soviet Foreign Aid: Scope, Directions, and Trends," Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies (Washington, 1974), p. 776.

TABLE 2

ESTIMATED COMMUNIST MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM
(Million current U.S. dollars)^a

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974 ^b
Military	205	315	750	330	400
Military equipment and materiel	140	240	565	230	275
Air defense equipment. . . .	20	85	310	100	55
Ground forces equipment. . .	45	80	110	40	45
Ammunition	70	60	130	85	170
Other.	5	15	15	5	5
Military transportation equip- ment (trucks, helicopters, transports).	20	15	30	35	25
Other military-related support (delivery and packaging costs, spare parts, POL for the mili- tary, technical assistance and training, medical supplies)	45	60	155	65	100
Economic	735	755	465	670	1,295
Commodity shipments.	635	645	360	540	1,145
Food	65	60	80	170	420
Fertilizer	10	15	5	5	25
Petroleum.	10	10	5	15	55
Machinery, transport equipment and metal products	240	175	125	165	345
Other.	310	385	145	185	300
Technical assistance (includes cost of foreign technicians in NVN and NVN trainees abroad)	100	110	105	130	150
Total of estimated Communist goods and services provided to North Vietnam.	940	1,070	1,215	1,000	1,695
Less--North Vietnamese exports to Communist countries ^c . . .	50	50	30	80	125
Total estimated Communist aid to North Vietnam.	890	1,020	1,185	920	1,570

^aBecause of rounding, individual figures do not always add to the totals in this table.

^bThe data for 1974 are preliminary.

^cSince North Vietnamese exports in these years paid for some of North Vietnam's imports, we have subtracted them to derive our estimate of Communist aid to North Vietnam.

Source: Joint CIA/DIA estimate for U. S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 3689, Part 1. 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, pp. 108-110.

(1) A resolution declaring all previous capital loans to be nonrefundable

(2) An agreement for the coordination of the national economic plans of the DRV and the USSR during the 1976-1980 period

(3) An aid package valued by Western diplomats at \$500 million spread over 40 capital projects⁴⁷

(4) An indication that Vietnam will probably be brought into the Council of Mutual Economic Aid (CEMA or "Comecon")⁴⁸

(5) A "joint stand on the major problems of international politics."

In addition to the above agreements with the Soviet Union, the DRV has received pledges for non-refundable economic aid from China, Bulgaria, and Poland; it has also made various economic, trade, cultural, and scientific agreements with each of the countries of Eastern Europe (see Appendix A, "Chronology" for the years 1975-76).

Soviet military assistance to North Vietnam has always been substantial, amounting to at least \$2.8 billion for the decade 1965-1974. It has shown a general downward trend since 1970; total military assistance for the years 1970-1974 (\$1060 million) was down some 75 per cent from 1965-1969 (\$1750 million), perhaps reflecting some Soviet war weariness. (For a list of the value of Soviet military assistance to North Vietnam by year see Table 1; for a list of total Communist military assistance to North Vietnam by year and by classification see Table 2.) It appears that all arms supplies from the USSR to North Vietnam are in the form of military grants.⁴⁹

Several conclusions can be drawn from examining the tables closely. As one might expect, the figures mirror changes in the military situation and suggest the nature of Soviet commitments. Thus in 1969 and 1970 the decrease in military aid probably reflected the Soviet perception that U.S. withdrawal would mean a lesser North Vietnamese requirement for weapons, vehicles, etc. In 1972 the large military aid figure would suggest some support for the Easter offensive and/or a requirement for defensive weapons and replacement equipment resulting from renewed U.S. bombing. The increase in economic aid and the corresponding decrease in military aid in 1972-73 reflect the 1973 peace agreement and the Soviet commitment to reconstruction.

SOVIET TRADE WITH THE DRV

North Vietnam has been an important Asian trading partner of the Soviet Union since the early 1960's. Total trade turnover (exports plus imports) in the years 1965-1975 has steadily risen from about \$100 million in 1965 to nearly \$300 million in 1975; as a result of agreements signed in October 1975 this figure should reach about \$450 million by 1980.⁵⁰ Total trade turnover in the years 1970-1975 was \$878.4 million, about 1½ times that of the previous six-year period. Soviet exports greatly exceed imports and the resulting trade surplus is thought largely to reflect Soviet grants or loans, thus giving a rough estimate of the cost of Soviet non-military aid to the North Vietnamese.⁵¹ Using

such a method, Soviet "trade aid" would total \$1.4 billion for the years 1965-1975. (See Table 3 for trade figures by year.)

Soviet exports to North Vietnam are primarily manufactured goods such as trucks, tractors, rolled stock, petroleum, chemical fertilizers, etc., while imports are mainly agricultural goods such as jute, tea, coffee, spices, bananas, etc.

TABLE 3

SOVIET TRADE WITH NORTH VIETNAM, 1965-1975
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Year	Imports	Exports	Trade Surplus	Total Trade Turnover
1975	66.6	220.5	153.9	287.1
1974	56.8	253.7	196.9	310.5
1973	50.1	194.1	144.0	244.2
1972	27.3	113.6	86.3	140.9
1971	23.9	154.8	130.9	178.7
1970	18.6	185.0	166.4	203.6
1969	16.7	188.9	172.2	205.6
1968	17.8	158.9	141.1	176.7
1967	21.1	147.8	126.7	168.9
1966	25.6	67.8	42.2	93.4
1965	31.1	74.4	43.3	105.5
Totals	355.6	1,759.5	1,403.9	2,115.1

Sources: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1968-1974, and United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, June, 1976.

CHAPTER III
SOVIET RELATIONS
WITH CAMBODIA AND LAOS

POLITICAL RELATIONS

Soviet foreign policy towards Cambodia (now Democratic Kampuchea) and Laos (now the People's Democratic Republic of Laos) before the Communist assumptions of power had basically been dualistic; that is, the Soviet Union had formally recognized and tried to maintain correct and friendly relations with regimes in power while at the same time supplying propaganda and material support to the "patriots" of both countries. Thus in Laos the Soviet Union had recognized Prince Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister while giving political and ideological support to the communist Pathet Lao. The Soviets tried to maintain the same dual approach in Cambodia after the Lon Nol coup in March 1970, recognizing his new regime while giving rather qualified support for Sihanouk's newly formed National United Front.

Once again the USSR was on the horns of a dilemma. In view of the Sino-Soviet hostility at the time, the Soviet Union apparently felt that it could not give unqualified support to the Sihanouk position, since the Prince had chosen to reside in Peking and seemed increasingly bound to the

Chinese. On the other hand, the bombing of Cambodia and the expanding ties of Lon Nol to the United States made continued Soviet recognition of his regime increasingly untenable. The USSR tried to improve its situation by calling for the neutralization of the Cambodian government and offering military assistance to Sihanouk, but the Prince firmly rebuffed the Soviet offer.⁵² (See Appendix B for Sihanouk's reasons for refusing the Soviet offer and his trenchant analysis of Russian attitudes and motives in Indochina.)

In October 1973 the Soviet Union finally extended recognition to Sihanouk's government-in-exile. This recognition appears to have been prompted by increasing gains by the "patriotic" forces and by the response of the unaligned nations to Sihanouk's denunciation of Soviet policies in Cambodia at the September 1973 Algiers conference.⁵³

Soviet sources have been noticeably silent on the Cambodian situation since an initial message of greeting after the Khmer Rouge takeover. The message stressed "developing traditional relations of friendship and fruitful cooperation" and pledged "material assistance of a humane nature."⁵⁴

Cambodia's current foreign policy appears to be based on neutrality, a desire to avoid Vietnamese or other foreign dominance, and maintaining good relations with China (from whom Cambodia received a sizable grant of free economic and technical assistance in late 1975).⁵⁵

It is not known what role, if any, Prince Sihanouk has played in the government since his return to Cambodia in January 1976.⁵⁶

Soviet relations with Laos in the early 1970's were characterized by the continued dualist (or ambiguous) nature of such relations (very much like those toward Cambodia), by the wish to limit the spill-over of the Vietnam fighting into Laos, by a desire to see a new neutralist coalition friendly to the Soviet Union, and by the encouragement of the Pathet Lao to pursue political negotiation as opposed to "people's war." Soviet policies appeared to be motivated primarily by increasing Sino-Soviet rivalry, and were directed at reducing China's influence while increasing its own.⁵⁷

The USSR's position on the 1973 Vientiane Agreement and Protocol have been stated as follows:

The Soviet Union welcomed the signing of the Vientiane Agreement and the Protocol to it, and the formation of the Provisional Government of National Unity and the Lao Political Council of National Coalition. The Soviet Union has invariably come out for the solution of Laotian domestic problem by Laotians, without foreign interference.

In its effort to facilitate in every way a political solution of the Laos issue and the rehabilitation of the Laotian economy the Soviet government offered its planes to airlift the patriotic forces' personnel and agreed to render gratuitous aid in prospecting, in the construction of a number of projects for the national economy, and to assist considerably the Provisional Government of National Unity by goods supplies.⁵⁸

Since the Pathet Lao formally assumed control of the Laotian government in December 1975 by a series of deftly executed political and military moves, the Soviet Union has indicated that it would "side with the people of Laos" and work to develop further relations between the communist

parties of the USSR and Laos.⁵⁹ Little time was lost in following up the initial feeler for further relations, for in January 1976 several agreements on Soviet economic assistance to Laos were signed⁶⁰ and in May a major joint Soviet-Laotian statement noting "complete identity of views" on matters discussed including the Middle East, Angola, Portugal, and Chile. The statement noted the following Soviet commitments:

The Soviet Union will continue rendering the PDRL assistance in the rehabilitation and development of the national economy, and also in training national manpower for various sectors of the economy and the culture of the PDRL.

During the delegation's stay in the Soviet Union, the Governments of the USSR and the PDRL signed an agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation; a USSR-PDRL trade treaty; a USSR-PDRL agreement on commodity turnover and payments; and a protocol on rendering assistance to Laos in establishing a state geological service.⁶¹

Additional evidence that the Soviet Union is serious about increasing its influence in Laos is the presence of 300-500 Soviet technicians, economists, and diplomatic personnel there.⁶²

SOVIET AID TO AND TRADE WITH CAMBODIA AND LAOS

The Soviet Union has had virtually no trade with Cambodia since 1970, nor has it given Cambodia any significant military or economic aid in the same period. There is no record of any Soviet follow-up of its April 1975 offer to extend Cambodia "material assistance of a humane nature."

Soviet trade with Laos in the period 1970-1975 has also been negligible (although exports of \$2.1 million were recorded for 1970). The amounts of Soviet economic and military aid to Laos during the period 1970-1975 cannot be determined, although some aid of both kinds has undoubtedly been given. During the period of the Thai blockade of the Laos border (November 1975 to January 1976) the Soviet Union airlifted fuel, food, and medicines into Vientiane.⁶³ One source did refer to an "estimated \$8 million Soviet commodity aid" promise in 1975.⁶⁴

Soviet aid to Communist Laos in the past has apparently been part of the Soviet aid program for North Vietnam. Recently, aid from Eastern Europe has been documented.⁶⁵

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

↙ Soviet political relations with the Indochinese nations in the 1970's continued to reflect the two major concerns of the USSR, namely its own national security interests and its great-power relationships (especially as they related to the United States and China). The Soviet Union's concern for the former prompted caution in supporting the revolutionary movements in Indochina, as evidenced in a Soviet preference for political solutions and a reluctance to support major North Vietnamese military offensives. The changing nature of the latter caused some major shifting of policy and strategy. Thus the decision of the United States to withdraw from Indochina left an "influence vacuum" which the Soviet Union perceived as being filled by China unless the USSR moved to prevent it. The Soviet Union apparently saw an increasing Chinese influence in North Vietnam, Cambodia, and elsewhere both as a threat to its position as a world power and leader of the Communist movement, and as an obstacle to its desire to be a major influence in Asia. →

At least as early as 1973 the Soviet Union perceived that the United States would be very unlikely to re-intervene in Indochina and that it probably would not continue

indefinitely to pour massive aid into South Vietnam. In such a case, North Vietnam would likely emerge as a winner either by forcing a political change in Saigon or by military victory (which, admittedly, the Soviets deemed unlikely in the near term).

In any event, South Vietnam collapsed, and the Soviet Union had the economic resources to meet the North Vietnamese reconstruction and reunification objectives. Since the collapse, Soviet agreements have multiplied rapidly and those agreements, if fully implemented, tie the Vietnamese very closely to the Soviet Union. The same is true for Laos.

So closely are the three countries (the USSR, the DRV, and Laos) knitted that it may take a major incident to force them apart. Of the three Indochinese nations, only Cambodia seems unlikely to join the Soviet sphere of influence.

APPENDIX A

VIETNAM CHRONOLOGY 1971-1976

1971

April 14. Moscow: Brezhnev received a delegation of the Vietnam Workers' Party, headed by Le Duan. The delegation expressed heartfelt gratitude to the Soviet Government for the great, effective and valuable assistance which the Soviet Union had been giving to the Vietnamese people and the patriots of Laos and Cambodia.

October 3-8. Hanoi: A delegation, headed by Nikolai Podgorny, paid an official visit to the DRV. During the visit, the negotiations took place on questions of further friendly cooperation between the USSR and the DRV, and on the situation in Vietnam and on the Indochina Peninsula. The sides also considered other international problems of mutual interest. The Soviet-Vietnamese Statement, adopted in Hanoi, stresses that there exist complete unanimity and full mutual understanding between the CPSU and the VWP, as well as between the USSR and the DRV on all the questions discussed.

1972

June 15-18. Hanoi: A Soviet delegation, headed by Nikolai Podgorny, paid a friendly unofficial visit to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Soviet and Vietnamese sides discussed strengthening and developing friendly relations, militant solidarity and fraternal cooperation.

1973

January 30. Moscow: Brezhnev received Le Duc Tho, who informed Leonid Brezhnev on the final stage of the Paris talks on Vietnam. The two sides expressed a determination to further strengthen, in every possible way, fraternal friendship and cooperation between the CPSU and the VWP, the USSR and the DRV.

July 9-16. Moscow: Le Duan and Pham Van Dong made an official friendly visit to the USSR. The delegation had talks with Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin, Andrei Gromyko, Andrei Grechko and Konstantin Katushev. The results of the visit marked a new and important stage in developing and expanding fraternal friendship and close cooperation between the two Parties and states. The Joint Soviet-Vietnamese Statement stressed the USSR's readiness to help restore the enterprises built in the DRV with Soviet assistance, and also to render help in building new industrial projects.

December 18-24. Moscow: A delegation of the Republic of South Vietnam, led by Dr. Nguyen Huu Tho, Chairman of the CC Presidium of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, stayed in the USSR. Talks were held between Nikolai Podgorny and Dr. Nguyen Huu Tho. The negotiations resulted in signing an agreement on rendering Soviet economic assistance to the Republic of South Vietnam.

1974

July 25-August 1. Moscow: Le Thanh Nghi, Chairman of Vietnam's State Planning Committee, came to the Soviet Union as a guest of the Soviet Government. Nghi had a number of conversations with Deputy Chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolai Baibakov and Vladimir Novikov. They discussed the main aspects of the further extension of economic ties between the two countries for the 1976-1980 period.

December 4. Moscow: Alexei Kosygin received Nguyen Duy Trinh, the head of a Vietnam Government economic delegation. They discussed economic, scientific and technical cooperation and Soviet assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1975. An agreement was signed on Soviet economic and technical assistance to the DRV.

1975

April 30. Complete liberation of Saigon-GiaDinh and Cholon at 11:30 a.m. on April 30, 1975.

April 30. Sofia: Signing of an agreement on Bulgarian non-repayable economic aid for the reconstruction of South Viet Nam.

May 12. Moscow: An agreement on Soviet economic aid to the population of South Vietnam in 1975 was signed. The agreement envisaged the supply of oil products, chemical fertilisers, lorries, passenger cars, medicines, food, fabrics and other items.

May 31. Peking: Signing of letters on emergency non-refundable aid from China to Viet Nam in order to contribute to the stabilization of the Vietnamese people's life and the restoration and development of its post-war economy.

June 12. Moscow: Signing of an agreement on emergency non-refundable aid from the USSR to Viet Nam to help the Vietnamese people stabilize their life, and restore and develop the post-war economy.

June 28. Hanoi: Signing of an agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation between the DRVN and the USSR for 1975.

July 11. Berlin: Signing of an agreement on additional aid for 1975 from the GDR to the DRVN.

August 21. Moscow: The 2nd session of the Viet Nam-USSR Committee for Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation adopted a plan for cooperation over the next five years (1976-1980).

August 21-25. Moscow: An inter-governmental Soviet-Vietnamese Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation was held. It considered various aspects of cooperation in rehabilitating and building a number of key projects for the national economy of the DRV, including energetics, mining, building materials and other industries, and also matters connected with the further extension of economic and trade cooperation. On August 25, a meeting was held between Alexei Kosygin and Le Thanh Nghi, Chairman of the DRV State Planning Committee and head of the DRV's government economic delegation.

August 28-September 5. Hanoi: A Soviet delegation was in the DRV on the invitation of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party. Meetings were held between the Soviet delegation and Le Duan and Pham Van Dong. In Hanoi, the Soviet delegation met with a delegation of the Laotian people led by Souphannouvong, and also with a delegation of Cambodia, headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

September 25. Peking: Signing of an agreement on loans without interest and a protocol on the supply of equipment and material from China to Viet Nam for 1976.

October 6. Budapest: Signing of an agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation between the DRVN and the Hungarian People's Republic.

October 10. Sofia: Signing of an agreement on economic cooperation between the DRVN and Bulgaria.

October 19. Berlin: Documents concerning cooperation, development of economic relations for 1976-1980, longterm loans from the GDR to Viet Nam, exchange of goods and payments between the two countries for 1976 were signed.

October 24. Prague: Agreements on long-term loans from Czechoslovakia to Viet Nam aimed at developing economic relations for 1976-1980, on exchange of goods and payments between the two countries were signed.

October 25. Peking: Signing of an agreement on exchange of goods and payments for 1976 between the People's Republic of China and the DRVN.

October 27-31. Moscow: An official friendly visit to the Soviet Union was paid by a delegation led by Le Duan. Leonid Brezhnev and Le Duan signed a Soviet-Vietnamese declaration. An agreement on economic assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and a protocol on the results of the coordination of national economy plans of the USSR and the DRV for 1976-1980 were also signed in the course of the visit.

November 4. Budapest: Signing of documents on the coordination of State plans for 1976-1980 between Hungary and Viet Nam.

November 12. Warsaw: End of the official friendship visit to the People's Republic of Poland (begun on November 8, 1975) of the delegation of the VNWP and the DRVN Government led by Le Duan. An agreement on long-term economic cooperation for 1976-1980 and a protocol on exchange of goods for 1976 were signed.

November 17. Bucarest: Signing between the DRVN and the Rumanian Socialist Republic of agreements on long-term loans from Rumania to Viet Nam, and on economic cooperation and exchange of goods between the two countries for 1976-1980.

November 20. Moscow: Signing between the USSR and the DRVN of an agreement on the construction of a Children's Palace in Hanoi with Soviet aid.

November 21. Warsaw: Signing between the DRVN and the Polish People's Republic of an agreement on non-refundable economic aid from Poland to Viet Nam for 1975.

November 22. Budapest: Signing between the DRVN and the Hungarian People's Republic of an agreement on cooperation between the two countries, on long-term loans from Hungary to Viet Nam for 1976-1980, and a protocol on the exchange of goods for 1976.

December 1. Hanoi: Signing between the DRVN and the People's Republic of China of an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation for 1975-1976.

December 16. Moscow: Signing between the DRVN and the USSR of an agreement on Soviet economic and technical aid to Viet Nam for the construction of industrial enterprises and other projects for 1976-1980.

1976

February 11. Hanoi: The delegation of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party led by Kaysone Phomvihane held talks with Le Duan. The two countries reached agreement on the

establishment of a Viet Nam-Laos Mixed Committee for Economic and Cultural Cooperation, on the common construction of a road from Laos to the Viet Nam coast, and the training of Lao cadres in economy, finance, science and technology with Vietnamese assistance.

Sources: International Affairs (Moscow) and Vietnam Courier (Hanoi).

APPENDIX B

SIHANOUK'S VIEWS ON RUSSIAN POLICIES IN INDOCHINA

We no longer expect anything from the Russians. We are fighting side by side with socialist Vietnamese and left-oriented Laotians, who are both helped and recognised by the USSR. We too had hoped that Moscow would treat us accordingly. However, the Russians turned us down. Recently, they offered to give us military help and to recognise us as a Front. We simply said "No." We told them that we want to be recognised as a government per se. This is the only thing we want from them, and this is the one thing the Russians refuse us. They want to give us aid, but the Chinese already give us all we need. We have more aid than we can use. We only need one type of aid, and that is to be recognised as the legal government of Cambodia, but this the Russians refuse....

I think the Russians consider themselves white, and they do not want yellow people to become too strong. It would be difficult for the USSR not to help North Vietnam, which belongs to the socialist family of nations. But I have seen what the Russians give the North Vietnamese. I have seen the jet planes, the radars, the missiles. None of this equipment is up to date. In terms of both quantity and quality, the Russians have not given Hanoi a quarter of what they have given the Egyptians. Why? Because the Russians don't want Hanoi to win. They will give the Vietnamese just enough to keep them from losing the war but not enough to enable them to win it. Speaking as an Asian, I feel that the Russians want to keep Asians in a state of subservience. There is, in the Russian mind, a neurotic fear of an imaginary "yellow peril" embodied by China. By hindering the Indochinese, the Russians are aiming at China. The Americans are also motivated by this same fear of China. Their intervention in Vietnam is aimed at China. They kill the Vietnamese because they are afraid of the Chinese. As for the Soviets, they do the same thing: they refuse to help the Cambodians because they are afraid of China. Ultimately, both the Americans and the Russians are motivated by a common racism, a common fear of a "yellow peril" embodied by China.

Source: Interview with Prince Norodom Sihanouk by Alessandro Casella in Far Eastern Economic Review, December 25, 1971, pp. 19-21.

FOOTNOTES

¹Robert C. Horn, "The Soviet Perspective," in Sudershan Chawla, Melvin Gurtov, and Alain-Gerard Marsot (eds.), South-east Asia Under the New Balance of Power (New York, 1974), p. 31. Cited hereafter as "Perspective."

According to Horn the Soviet Union seems to rank South-east Asia just behind the Middle East and South Asia among Soviet interest priorities in the developing countries.

²J. L. S. Girling, "Russia and Indochina in International Perspective," International Affairs (London), October, 1973, pp. 608-609.

³Robert C. Horn, "Soviet Influence in Southeast Asia: Opportunities and Obstacles," Asian Survey, August, 1975, p. 656. Cited hereafter as "Influence."

See also Horn, "Perspective," pp. 31-32.

⁴"The Rivals," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 13, 1975, p. 22.

⁵Horn, "Influence," pp. 662-663.

⁶Robert C. Horn, "Moscow's Southeast Asian Offensive," Asian Affairs, March/April, 1975, p. 218.

⁷A. Sergeyev, "The Just Cause of the Indochina Peoples Has Triumphed," International Affairs (Moscow), July, 1975, p. 49. Cited hereafter as "Just Cause."

⁸Soviet ideologists trace the concept to Asian diplomacy based on Lenin's "Decree on Peace." See A. Sergeyev, "Problems of Collective Security in Asia," International Affairs (Moscow), August, 1975, p. 49. Cited hereafter as "Problems."

They see the concept as being implicit in the principles espoused at the Bandung Conference of 1955. In 1969 the plan came into full bloom, starting with an article in Izvestia which was closely followed by a major Brezhnev speech; see V. V. Matveyev, "A Filled Vacuum," Izvestia, May 29, 1969, p. 3 and Leonid Brezhnev's speech in Pravda, June 8, 1969, p. 9. Brezhnev gave another major speech on the subject at the 15th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions (see Pravda, March 21, 1972, p. 1).

Since then the plan has been given increased exposure in the Soviet press, and after the communist Indochina victories in 1975 a veritable flood of articles stressing the merits of the plan has ensued. The Soviet foreign relations journal International Affairs has carried three major expositions on the subject in the last year, and virtually every article celebrating the Indochina victories has included

some reference to its desirability.

⁹A. Sergeyev, "Political Realities and Security in Asia," International Affairs (Moscow), June, 1976, p. 53. Cited hereafter as "Realities."

¹⁰A. Sergeyev, "Problems," p. 56.

¹¹Harold C. Hinton, "Chinese and Soviet Interests in Indochina," in Peter A. Poole (ed.), Indochina: Perspectives for Reconciliation (Athens, Ohio, 1975), pp. 23, 25.

¹²Sergeyev, "Just Cause," p. 49.

¹³Donald S. Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi (New York, 1967), pp. 31-34.

Zagoria describes Soviet policy as the "pursuit of negative goals," most clearly characterized by what risks and circumstances the USSR hopes to avoid.

¹⁴Horn, "Influence," p. 657.

¹⁵Zagoria, op. cit., pp. 35, 40-42.

¹⁶Horn, "Perspective," p. 40.

¹⁷The Soviet press abounds with praise for its "allround assistance" and "crucial support" to the DRV. See particularly A. Sergeyev, "DRV: Three Heroic Decades," International Affairs (Moscow), October, 1975, pp. 15-23. This article is perhaps the best available summary in English of the entire Vietnam liberation movement from the Soviet point of view. It also presents a relatively complete list of Soviet agreements with the DRV and includes substantial details on aid agreements. Cited hereafter as "DRV."

¹⁸Horn, "Influence," pp. 663-666.

See also John R. Thomas, "The Soviet Union," in Gene T. Hsiao (ed.), The Role of the External Powers in the Indochina Crisis (Edwardsville, Illinois, 1973), pp. 103-104.

¹⁹For a fuller explanation of Soviet actions and motives at Geneva and a discussion of that agreement and the evidence of the Soviet Union's "trade" of an Indochina armistice in exchange for a French pledge to abandon the European Defense Treaty, see Zagoria, op. cit., pp. 40-42; also Jeffery Jukes, The Soviet Union in Asia (Berkeley, 1973), pp. 206-207; and Edith Lenart, "Indochina: Each to his Own," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 13, 1975, p. 25.

²⁰Thomas, op. cit., pp. 91-95. See also Hinton, op. cit., pp. 16, 19-20.

²¹Thomas, loc. cit. Also see "The Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in Connection with the Aggression of the U.S. in Vietnam," Pravda, December 10, 1965.

²²An article in Pravda labeled any such attempt at pressure on the Soviet Union as reflecting "a loss of touch with reality." See I. Aleksandrov, "In Regard to the Contacts of Peking and Washington," Pravda, July 25, 1971, pp. 4-5.

²³Horn, "Perspective," p. 41.

²⁴Thomas, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 100-103.

²⁶Cited in Carlyle A. Thayer, "The Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1974: The Politics of Transition," Asian Survey, January, 1975, p. 64. See also Hinton, op. cit., pp. 20-22.

²⁷Horn, "Influence," p. 666. Three high-ranking Soviet officials were sent to Hanoi to reaffirm Moscow's support for North Vietnam immediately after Kissinger's secret visit to Moscow in April 1972.

²⁸Hinton, op. cit., p. 22.

²⁹Ibid., p. 20.

³⁰Thayer, op. cit., p. 64. President Nixon's 1972 "secret" eight-point proposal included a \$7.5 billion reconstruction program (See Kenneth P. Langdon, "United States Policy Toward Indochina," in Gene T. Hsiao, op. cit., p. 41). See also Far Eastern Economic Review, January 21, 1974, p. 27, and The Times /London/, March 10, 1974.

³¹Thayer, op. cit., pp. 62, 65. For a short period after the meeting it appeared that U.S.-DRV relations might normalize and that no offensive would occur, but such was not to be the case.

³²Carlyle A. Thayer, "North Vietnam in 1975: National Liberation, Reunification, and Socialist Construction," Asian Survey, January, 1976, pp. 14-17. Hereafter cited as "Vietnam '75."

³³Sheldon W. Simon, "Peking and Indochina: The Perplexity of Victory," Asian Survey, May, 1976, p. 402. See also Far Eastern Economic Review, June 13, 1975, p. 14.

³⁴Thayer, "Vietnam '75," pp. 16-17.

³⁵Ibid., p. 17.

³⁶On the Soviet appraisal of United States positions in the period 1973-1975, see Sergeyev, "Just Cause," pp. 42-44.

³⁷See especially Sergeyev, "DRV," p. 21, and "Just Cause," p. 49.

³⁸A. Krikunov, "Fraternal Friendship and Militant Solidarity," International Affairs (Moscow), January, 1976, p. 34. This same Soviet-Vietnamese Declaration describes the joint relationship as "unbreakable and everlasting," p. 37.

³⁹Simon, op. cit., pp. 401-404. Several economic agreements between the two have been signed, however. For other discussions of China's fears and reactions to Vietnam's victory see Far Eastern Economic Review, June 13, 1975, pp. 23-26.

⁴⁰My main source for estimates was the article "Soviet Arms Aid to Hanoi Is Down," New York Times, April 12, 1972. I am almost certain this is a United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimate, although the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) may have had some input, also.

In any event, it became evident to me from checking several sources that the CIA figures were used as a base for almost all estimates quoted. In 1975 this CIA/DIA estimate was updated using a slightly more sophisticated data base and incorporating minor changes in interpretive technique. The result is the table "Estimated Communist Military and Economic Assistance to North Vietnam," from which my estimates for 1972-74 were drawn. I am fairly certain my estimates are accurate within ± 10 per cent of any estimate (adjusted for price inflation) one might find in the New York Times or a study prepared for Congress.

As a final note, I may say that the firm consensus is that the CIA/DIA estimate is very conservative. Charles B. McLane, for example, in Soviet-Asian Relations (London, 1973), p. 9, puts the value of just Soviet military aid to Hanoi at "approximately \$1 billion annually by 1968."

⁴¹A rare valuation was given in a recent article, which listed the material assistance of the USSR and other socialist countries to the DRV in the decade 1955-1964 at 300 million rubles (\$333 million) in the form of long-term credits to finance 108 industrial enterprises. Sergeyev, "DRV," p. 17.

⁴²Ibid., p. 22.

⁴³Y. Yurtsev, "Indochina's Burning Issues," International Affairs (Moscow), February, 1975, p. 59. Numerous similar references have appeared in the Soviet press.

⁴⁴For detailed analyses of the 1973-74 agreements see Sergeyev, "DRV," pp. 22-23.

⁴⁵For abstracts of the text with commentary see Irina Trofimova, "The Soviet Union and Vietnam," New Times, November, 1975, pp. 6-7, and Krikunov, op. cit., pp. 33-37. The text of the declaration itself was published in Pravda, October 31, 1975.

⁴⁶My own designation.

⁴⁷Simon, op. cit., p. 403. There are some minor differences here between Western and Soviet sources; compare A. Volodin in "Under the Banner of Socialist Internationalism," Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, November, 1975, p. 20.

⁴⁸Simon, loc. cit. An earlier Soviet source states: "The economic ties of the DRV with other CEMA member nations are continually being strengthened and developed." A. Voronin, "Years of Conflict and Achievement," Ekonomicheskaya Industriya, August, 1975, p. 20.

⁴⁹Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Arms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm, 1971), p. 182.

⁵⁰Volodin, loc. cit. "Commodities turnover between both countries will rise by more than 1.5 times."

⁵¹Jeoffrey Jukes, The Soviet Union in Asia (Berkeley, 1973), p. 270.

⁵²Girling, op. cit., pp. 609-611; see also Horn, "Perspective," pp. 41-42.

⁵³Horn, "Perspective, p. 43.

⁵⁴Y. Yurtsev, "The Cambodian Patriots Score Successes," International Affairs (Moscow), May, 1975, p. 71.

⁵⁵Simon, op. cit., pp. 408-409. See also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, December 1-7, 1975, p. 27470, where the aid is described as "an interest-free loan of about \$1,000 million [sic], repayable in five to six years."

⁵⁶He has not been heard from since March, 1976. It is believed he may have been executed. See Edith Lenart, "Power Behind the Throne," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 28, 1976, p. 14.

⁵⁷Paul F. Langer, "The Soviet Union, China, and the Revolutionary Movement in Laos," Studies in Comparative Communism, Spring/Summer, 1973, pp. 68-69.

⁵⁸Y. Mikheyev, "Laotian Patriots: Years of Struggles and Victories," International Affairs (Moscow), November, 1975, p. 48.

⁵⁹Y. Yurtsev, "A fresh Start for Laos," International Affairs (Moscow), May, 1976, p. 68.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 70.

⁶¹"Joint Soviet-Laotian Statement," Pravda, May 5, 1975, pp. 1, 4.

⁶²Simon, op. cit., p. 405; see also MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, "Laos in 1975: People's Democratic Revolution--Lao Style," Asian Survey, February, 1976, p. 199.

⁶³Yurtsev, op. cit., p. 69.

⁶⁴Nayan Chanda, "Bridging the Food Gap in Laos," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 13, 1976, p. 98.

⁶⁵Langer, op. cit., pp. 75-78.

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